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The Sherby decision has also made an exception to the generally
followed rule of respondeat superior,91 basing its holding on parental
tort immunity, a rule which bears a heavy burden of justification be-
cause of its wholesale denial of the right to suit to unemancipated chil-
dren. The Sherby court disregarded the trend toward abrogation of the
parental immunity doctrine, and the fact that the decision contravenes
the positions taken by Professor Prosser, the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, and the great majority of Amercian jurisdictions which have
ruled on parental immunity/respondeat superior. To base a decision
on an immunity from suit which appears to be so judicially eroded that
its total abrogation is apparently coming in the foreseeable future, gives
the Sherby decision a tenuous base, indeed. This base hardly seems
sufficient to justify a denial of recovery to the injured child for injuries
which would ordinarily be compensable, but for the family relationship.
STEWART MINOR HuRTr
THE GROSS ESTATE AND THE DEATH TAX CREDIT
At a decedent's death his estate may be subject to two or more
death taxes. Both the federal government' and all but one of the
states2 levy some form of death tax. To lessen the impact of these taxes,
section 2o1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19543 provides a credit
to decedent's estate for state death taxes actually paid. Due to the fact
that many state death taxes vary considerably from the federal estate
tax 4 some confusion has arisen as to exactly which state death taxes
qualify for the credit allowed under section 2011.
91A noted authority in the tort field states:
No legal doctrine has been so generally criticized and yet so gener-
ally adhered to by the courts as the doctrine of respondent su-
perior.
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COL. L. REv. 444, 452 (1923).
1INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 2001-2209. (General sections dealing with or con-
cerning the federal estate tax.)
2Nevada is the only state which does not levy a death tax. See THE ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TAX OVERLAPPING IN THE UNITED
STATES 151 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as TAx OVERLAPPING].
3INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2011. This section provides in part:
(a) In General-The tax imposed by section 2001 shall be credited with
the amount of any estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes
actually paid to any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
in respect of any property included in the gross estate (not in-
cluding any such taxes paid with respect to the estate of a person
other than decedent). (emphasis added).
'See Commonwelath v. Morris, 196 Va. 868, 86 S.E.2d 135 (1955). The court
in Morris described the Virginia inheritance tax as follows:
The tax imposed is a succession tax, laid upon the right to succeed
CASE COMMENTS
Recently the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, in Second National Bank v. United States,5 refused to allow
decedent's estate a credit against the federal estate tax for state death
taxes paid on property that was not subject to tax as part of the federal
estate.6 The estate had sought a credit under section 2olt for state
(Connecticut) death taxes paid with respect to a trust7 established by
the decedent, Frederick F. Brewster.8 The trust assets were not includ-
ed in the federal gross estate because decedent's reversionary interest in
to the property or to an interest therein as distinguished from an
estate tax laid on the right to transmit property. 'An inheritance or
estate tax is not levied on the property of which an estate is com-
posed. Rather it is imposed upon the shifting of economic benefits
and the privilege of transmitting or receiving such benefits.'
Id. at 871, 86 S.E.2d at 137. See generally Karch, The Appointment of Death Taxes,
54 HAIV. L. RFv. 1o (1940).
5422 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1970). For a more complete statement of the facts involved
in prior controversies (not relevant to this discussion) concerning the amount of
federal estate taxes due from this estate, see Second Nat'l Bank v. United States,
222 F. Supp. 44 6 (D. Conn. 1963), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 351 F.2d 489 (2d Cir.
1965), aff'd, 387 U.s. 456 (1967).
6The dissenting justice felt that there was nothing in section 2o11(a) that either
expressly or inferentially makes it a requirement of the state tax credit that the
same property be taxed by the federal authorities, since, in his estimation, the
statute contains no requirement that each item subjected to state death taxes be
compared with those subjected to the federal tax in order to qualify for the credit.
He was further concerned that the denial of the credit would involve a substantial
loss of revenue to the state and give rise to a possible question of constitutionality
and federal-state relations. 422 F.2d at 42 (dissenting opinion).
1See Second Nat'l Bank v. United States, 297 F. Supp. io8o (D. Conn. 1969).
The district court discussed the trust in great detail. Decendent made a transfer
which was effective at his death on September 16, 1958 under an indenture of trust
dated February 15, 1929 for the benefit of his son, John.
This indenture gave John the income for life with the remainder to his
sister and brothers or their issue, spouses, or appointees. Absent survival
of any of this large class of beneficiaries, the trustees were directed to
'... deliver and pay the entire remainder of the trust fund free from
the trust herein created to the parties of the first part [the decedent
and his wife], or if the parties of the first part shall not then both
be living, to their survivor.'
Thus, by the express terms of this indenture, the decedent had retained
a reversionary interest, albeit one of limited value.
Id. at 1081.
'The State of Connecticut assessed the value of the trust assets at $931,o31.7o.
and the tax attributable to such assets at $69,422.88. The estate was seeking a
state death tax credit of the amount which was paid to the state by the estate.
422 F.2d at 41. This sum included the tax on the trust assets and an estate tax
of $150,302.22. 297 F. Supp. at io8i. The Connecticut estate tax, in effect at Brewster's
death, is the difference between the succession tax paid Connecticut and the maxi-
mum federal credit as determined by 201(b). See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-391
(Supp. 1970).
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the corpus was less than 5 per cent at his death.9 The Court of Appeals
held that the credit allowable under section 2o11(a) was restricted to
property that was also included in the federal gross estate.' 0
The court, relying primarily on the legislative history," determined
that Congress enacted the tax credit to prevent the states from engaging
in tax slashing competition in an attempt to lure the wealthy into
states with lower death taxes. "This was to be accomplished by the
means of a tax credit against the federal estate tax to avoid double taxa-
tion of estate assets."' 12 The court reasoned that since ".... there [was]
no federal tax on the property, and only one state tax is imposed, there
[could] hardly be any reason for the tax credit. .. ."13 Furthermore, the
court felt that this was the only interpretation consistent with the ra-
tionale of the federal estate tax,'4 that tax being an excise imposed on
the shifting relationship of the property, as opposed to a levy on the
property of which the estate is composed.15 This determination was
thought to be buttressed by the Treasury regulations, 16 which in the
'INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2037. See generally R. STEPHENS AND G. MAXFIELD, THE
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFrT TAXES 75-85 (2nd ed. 1967), [hereinafter cited as STEPHENS
AND MAXFIELD]. Connecticut in revising its tax laws has subsequently amended this
sections to correspond with the federal act. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-341(b)
(Supp. 1970-71).
10422 F.2d at 40. This was a reversal of the district court which, after careful
analysis of the legislative history, had held that decedent's estate was entitled to
credit against the federal estate tax for state death taxes paid with respect to pro-
perty of decedent even though such property was not included in decedent's federal
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Second Nat'l Bank v. United States,
297 F. Supp. io8o (D. Conn. 1969).
"The court relied on statements made by Representatives on the House floor
during discussion of legislation concerning the death tax credit. These statements
concerned tax slashing competition between the states and the avoidance of double
taxation. See 67 CONG. REc. 3684 (1926); 67 CONG. REc. 695 (1925); II Rep. No. I, 69th
Cong. 1st Sess. 14, 1939-1 Cum. BULL. (Part 2) 315, 325.
12422 F.2d at 42.
"Id.
141d. In a footnote, the Court of Appeals mentions the following cases which
it felt supported the government's claim. Estate of Morsman, 14 B.T.A. io8 (1930);
Anna Brock, 16 B.T.A. 1358 (1929); and Robert C. Moore, Jr., 21 B.T.A. 279 (1931).
In Morsman, the Board of Tax Appeals held that the trust fund upon which the
tax had been paid "did not constitute part of the gross estate for Federal estate-tax
purposes" and disallowed a claimed credit for payment of a state transfer tax. This
decision concerned the 25% credit of § 3o(b) of the Revenue Act of 1924, which
was the predecessor of the present 80% death tax credit. The amount involved was
only $131.71 which was -insignificant to the total credit sought. The Brock court
never really discussed the issue and in Moore, which relied on both Morsman and
Brock, the credit issue was not decided on its merits because there was no proof that
taxpayer had actually paid taxes to the state with respect to the property in question.
"See United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57 (1939).
"The Treasury Regulations promulgated concerning this section are as follows:
Treas. Reg. § 2o.2oli-(a) (1954); Treas. Reg. 1o5 (1939 Code) Sec. 81.1; Treas. Reg.
80 (1937 ed.) Art. 9(b); Treas. Reg. 8o (1934 ed.) Art. 9(b); Treas. Reg. 70 (1929 ed.)
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court's opinion, have consistently referred to the words "gross estate"
in the context of "gross estate for federal tax purposes" with no express
disapproval by Congress. 17
The predecessor' 8 to the present credit was first enacted in 1924
and under it a 25 per cent credit was allowed for state death taxes. This
credit was enacted during a period when there was a general desire on
the part of many'9 that the federal government vacate this area of
taxation inasmuch as it was a traditional source of revenue to the
states.20 However, due to the action of same states,2' it became apparent
that if this matter were left solely to the states, competition would arise
among the several states to revoke or lower their death taxes in an at-
tempt to lure wealthy elders into those states with lower or non-existent
Art. 9(a); Treas. Reg. 68 (1924 ed.) Art. 9(a). Treas. Reg. 105 (1939 Code) Sec. 81.1
is representative of the prior regulations:
The credit is limited to the amount of the estate, inheritance,
legacy, or succession taxes paid to any State, Territory, possession of
the United States, or the District of Columbia in respect of property
included in the gross estate of the decedent for Federal estate tax
purposes.
Contra, Treas. Reg. § 20.2011-1(a). T.D. 6526, 196i-s Cum. BULL. 402.
"7See Mitchell v. Commissioner, 3oo F.2d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 1962). The Court
in Mitchell discussed the effect of Congressional re-enactment on Treasury Regula-
tions. The court felt that this was important but that if such regulations were
found to be contrary to historical intent they need not be followed.
28Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 301, 43 Stat. 253.
2967 CONG. REc. 522 (1925) (remarks of Representative Green). When introducing
the x926 Revenue Bill, Representative Green stated:
A claim had been set up, and a claim which I must say was not
without considerable foundation, that the States needed this
revenue, and that the Federal Government had appropriated to
itself so much of the sources of taxation the States were unable to
find the funds necessary to carry on their legitimate and proper
functions. So there arose an effort, largely assisted by propaganda-
I do not mean at this time improperly-in favor of the abolition of
the Federal inheritance tax in order, as it was claimed, that the
States might make use of this means of raising revenue. But there
also had arisen in the meantime one great obstacle to this plan, con-
sidered independently of its merits.
Id.
1924 SEC. TPEAs. RE!P. 11-12. According to the secretary, states had occupied
the death tax field long before the intrusion by the Federal Government. See also
J. MfAXWELL, TAx CREDITS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS 19-2o (1962)
[hereinafter cited as MAXWELL].
"For example:
Florida in 1924, by constitutional amendment, forbade enactment
of death taxes by its legislature. By supplementing the attractions
of its climate with the attractions of a taxhaven, Florida hoped that
rich people would domicile themselves within its borders. Nevada
took the same step, with the same hope, in 1925.
fAxWELL at 21.
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death tax burdens.2 2 As a result of these factors, Congress in 192623 rais-
ed the tax credit from -5 per cent to its present level of 8o per cent. It
was generally anticipated that under the higher credit the states would
be able to use their various death taxes as a source of revenue without
danger of competition from states with lower death tax burdens.
2 4 It
was also contemplated that through the use of this higher credit the
overall federal tax burden would be reduced, an objective of the fed-
eral tax policy in the 1920's.25 Congress also hoped that the increased
credit would engender some uniformity in the state taxes, 26 but this
267 CONG. REc. 522 (1925) (remarks of Representative Green). Representative
Green stated concerning the abolition of the estate tax in Florida:
The State of Florida had adopted a provision in its constitution
forbidding the levying of either inheritance or income taxes. The
object of this provision was plain. The purpose and intent of it
was to draw from other States people of wealth who would, by
bringing within its boundaries such of their personal property as
might be subject to tax, and with the investments they might there
make greatly increase the wealth of that community. The example
of Florida, and its apparent success, because it did succeed in draw-
ing qutie a number of men of wealth within its boundaries, had
its influence upon other States, and it was soon apparent that not
alone [sic] Florida but the whole country would be plunged into
a competition between the various States as to which could offer
the most favorable inducements to men of wealth to settle within
their boundaries.
id.
2Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 3oi(b), 44 Stat. 2oo7.
OSee generally II Rep. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 1939-1 Cuss. BuLL. (part
2) 15. This report prepared by the House Committee of Ways and Means con-
cerning the Revenue Act of 1926 stated:
Under the present law [Revenue Act of 1924] a credit is allowed
upon these [Federal estate] taxes of the amount of any inheritance
or estate tax paid to any State, up to 25 percent of the Federal tax.
In order to give the various States full freedom to make use of this
tax, the committee decided to extend the credit which might be so
allowed up to 8o per cent of the Federal tax. The several States. by
the use of this provision, will be enabled to make use of the in-
heritance tax without additional cost to its dtizens.
Id. at 325.
zSee ADvisoRy COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERMIENTAL RELATION, COORDINATION OF
STATE AND FEDERAL INHERITANCE, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAXES 28 (1961) [herinafter cited
as ADvisoRy COIMISSION REPORT].
26See- 67 CONG. REC. 966 (1925) (remarks of Representative Burtness). Repre-
sentative Burtness stated during debate over the estate tax credit that:
By adopting 5o per cent [credit] instead of 8o [per cent] you
will leave the same incentive that the committee had in mind-the
incentive to get States to pass more or less uniform inheritance tax
laws with a view of getting a full benefit of such credit as may be
provided in the law.
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objective was hindered because uniformity was not made a condition
of eligibility for the credit.27
States reacted to this increased credit in various ways. Those states
that had abolished their death taxes enacted some form of tax in order
to take advantage of the credit.28 Some states adopted death tax statutes
based on the federal estate tax;29 others raised their present taxes
in order to gain maximum advantage under the credit.30 The majority
of states, in an attempt to procure full advantage of the credit, enacted
"pick-up" statutes.31 These statutes vary from state to state, but most
assure the state the maximum amount of credit by absorbing or "pick-
ing-up" the difference between the state tax on a decedent's estate and
the maximum credit allowed against the federal levy.3 2
"See Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 301(b), 44 Stat. 2007. See also ADISORY
COMMISSION REPORT at i i.
'Florida and Alabama enacted death tax legislation to take advantage of the
tax credit. Only Nevada has refrained from such legislation. See TAX OVERLAPPING
at 151.
!New York and Mississippi adopted estate type taxes. See Perkins, State Action
Under the Federal Estate Tax Credit Clause, 13 N.C.L. REv. 271, 281 (1935).
O°Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and
Virginia increased their inheritance tax rates apparently to take advantage of the
credit. Id. at 280 n.32.
-9See TAx OVERLAPPINc at 151-152. The commission found that the taxes used
by the various states are as follows:
In general outline, these taxes fall into several categories. The
simplest are the five estate taxes patterned after the Federal statute
and designed to impose a tax liability equal to the maximum credit
allowed against the Federal tax. Some of these so-called "pickup"
taxes, originally intended to preempt for the States the exact
amount of the credit, have departed from this pattern; they have
been overlaid with provisions at variance with those of the Internal
Revenue Code....
Four states use estate taxes and 35 (including the District of
Columbia) use inheritance taxes, supplementing each with a "pick-
up" statute to absorb any unused credit; 2 use only inheritance
taxes and 2 only estate taxes, but each of these employs tax rates
substantially in excess of maximum credit, obviating the need for
"pick-up" taxes; i State employs all three: An inheritance tax, and
estate tax, and a "pickup" tax, i an estate tax and an inheritance
tax but no "pickup" tax, while still another employs none of them.
There are important variations in virtually every structural
feature of the States' taxes-in definitions of the gross tax base, in
deductions and exemptions as well as in rates and payment pro-
visions .... Rates are generally graduated, but some States employ
flat rates, differentiating between two or more classes of relation-
ships of the heir to the decedent. The variety literally defies
summation.
Id.
W"Pick-up" statutes are those enacted to insure that the state gets full advantage
of the maximum federal death tax credit. Many such statutes 4,re enacted so that the
1971]
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The "pick-up" tax is one of the reasons that at present there is
such a disparity among the various state tax structures. State legisla-
tors, relying on the "pick-up" taxes to absorb losses of revenue due to
reductions in the state inheritance or succession taxes, have felt free
to bow to pressure for changes or relief provisions in such taxes.83 The
capacity of the original act to achieve federal-state tax coordination has
been further undermined by subsequent legislative developments such
as increasing federal revenue through a supplementary estate tax
against which no credit was allowable for death taxes paid to states.8 4
Those states desiring more revenue have had to seek it through levies in
excess of the maximum allowable credit.3 5 Further adding to the death
tax heterogeneity are those states which originally enacted estate taxes
based on the federal estate tax, but have subsequently departed from
this pattern.36
Under section 2oi l(a), and its predecessors, it has been a relatively
simple matter to determine whether or not state death taxes qualified
for the state death tax credit.3 7 There are only two distinct limitations
inherent in the statute. The first limitation is that the credit would be
difference between the amount of the state inheritance and the maximum Federal
credit is automatically added to the total state taxes due. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 12-391 (Supp. 1970); VA. CoDE ANN. § 58-162 (1969 Repl. Vol.)
33See TAx OVERLAPPING at 151.
2USee INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, §§ 2001, 201(b), (d).See also Hearing on S. 2483
Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Govt
Operations, gist Cong., 1st Sess., 92-93 (1969). William G. Colman, the Executive
Director of the Advisory Commission, in a prepared statement noted that:
The capacity of the original 1926 tax credit (80 per cent of the 1926
Federal liability) to achieve Federal-State tax coordination has been
undermined by Federal legislative developments. On several occa-
sions during the succeding fifteen years, Federal estate tax rates
were increased and exemptions reduced in order to increase Federal
revenues. This was accomplished by enacting the increases in the
form of separate estate tax against which no credit was allowed for
taxes paid to States. Thus, as previously noted, the Federal tax
credit for State death tax payments now accounts for only io per
cent of the Federal liability. At the present time, States are ex-
tremely reluctant to change their death tax policies because of
the vulnerability to interstate tax competition.
Id. at 93.
31Cf. ADvisoRy COMMISSION REPORT at 45-36.
"'See TAX OVERLAPPING at 151.
'UNrrED STATES TAX FORM 706 provides instructions, a table, and an example
to aid the taxpayer in claiming the § o1 credit. The present form merely requires
that the tax payer consult Table B and insert the proper figure in blank No. 2
in order to compute the net estate tax payable. There is no requirement that the
taxpayer list or explain on what property the state death taxes were levied-only
the amount paid must be certified,
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ineffective if the estate incurred no federal estate tax.38s Secondly, the
credit will be ineffective for state death tax levies in excess of the 8o
per cent maximum limitation.39
It is evident that under these somewhat simple limitations it
would be an easy matter to correlate the differences between the federal
estate tax and the various state death taxes.4 0 Specifically, in areas of
diversity, such as in the taxation of annuities41 or of jointly owned
property with the right of survivorship,42 states that tax these assets
differently than they are taxed under the federal estate laws would
nevertheless receive credit revenues under the original two limitations.
The Court of Appeals in Second National Bank has imposed an
additional limitation to those previously mentioned. This third limita-
tion, stated simply, is that the credit is ineffective where the specific
property taxed by the state has not been included in the federal gross
estate. The third limitation is the result of seemnigly mistaken em-
phasis placed by the court on the avoidance of double taxation.
43
Under the preferable interpretation of the legislative intent, it would
make no difference as far as the death tax credit is concerned whether
or not the Brewster trust property was included in the Federal gross
estate.4 4 Congress was concerned with more than just preventing double
18Due to the relatively high exemptions under the federal estate tax statutes
states have levied death taxes on smaller estates which are exempt under federal law.
Therefore these levies do not qualify for the state death tax credit. Compare INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 2o52 with CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE, § 13801 (West 197o); N.Y.
TAx LAw, § 249-q (McKinney 1966). See MAXWELL at 2i5; ADVISORY COMMISSION
REPORT at 37-38.
-See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2011(b).
"0Cf., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 201(a). See also note 37 supra.
"1Compare INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2039 with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-152 to -162
(1969 repl. vol.) (there is no express provision covering annuities under the
Virginia statute) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5 73 1.og(A) and (B) (Baldwin Supp.
1970).
"Compare INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2040 with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 12-343
(1958) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5731.10(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1969).
"1See 422 F.2d 40. The Court of Appeals discussing the effect of the tax credit
sought on the trust property stated:
When, as here, there is no federal tax on the property, and only one
State tax is imposed, there can hardly be any reason for the tax
credit, which was designed to avoid the burden of double taxation.
(exphasis added)
Id. at 42.
"Under the original two limitations inherent in § 2011 the trust property would
clearly qualify for the state death tax credit. Text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
Also, by allowing the state a credit on the trust property, COnnecticut was able to
use its historic form of death tax as a source of revenue. Note 24 supra; text ac-
companying notes 45 and 46 infra.
1971]
262 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
taxation-the credit was intended to reduce the overall tax burden 45
on the estate while at the time time allowing the states full use of their
various death taxes as a source of revenue free from tax-slashing com-
petition.46 Under this third limitation the State of Connecticut stands
to lose considerable revenue47 and in order to make sure that such loss
does not recur it will have to modify its estate or succession tax laws. 48
Likewise, the Treasury regulations49 relied on by the court were in
conflict with the design of the section as revealed by its structure and
legislative history.50 The court was not entirely accurate in its statement
that these regulations have been consistent for more than forty years.
In its most recent regulation the Treasury did not speak of the gross
estate in the context of the federal gross estate.51 The court would have
4See 67 CONG. R c. 4429 (1926) (remarks of Representative Mills). During
debate over the State Death Tax Credit Representative Mills stated:
[T]he greater tax the State takes, the less ability the individual
estate has to pay the Federal Tax.
[This] is the basis of the 8o per cent rebate. It is an honest and
sincere attempt to base a Federal tax rate on the ability of the indi-
vidual estates throughout the United States to pay a Federal tax,
and their ability in turn is dependent on the tax they have to pay
the States.
In addition, it insures throughout the United States uniformity
of taxation if you take the really important factor into considera-
tion, that of total taxes combined, State and local.
Id.
"Note 22 supra.
17As a result of the denial of the credit to the taxpayer on the trust property,
the estate subsequently brought an action against the State of Connecticut for a
refund of the Connecticut estate tax paid in the amount of the sum denied as a
credit by the IRS. If taxpayer is successful in this action it may cost the state as
much at $69,422.88, the amount of the Connecticut succession tax on the trust
property. Notes 9 and io supra.
4It may make a difference what type of pick-up statute is used by the state.
For example, in Second Nat'l Bank the taxpayer paid to the State of Connecticut
the full amount of succession tax, $95o,683.55, which included the tax on the
trust property, and the entire Connecticut "pick-up" tax of $150,303.22. 297 F.
Supp. at io8i. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-391 (Supp. 1970). This section is
designed to absorb the difference between the succession tax and the maximum
credit. As a result of Second Nat'l Bank credit is disallowed on the trust assets
resulting in a loss of revenue to the state of $69,422.88 (the amount of the succession
taxes attributable to the trusts assets). If a pure "pick-up" type tax had been im-
posed the entire 8o per cent credit would have been allowable. Under such statutes
exactly 8o per cent of whatever the federal tax may be. Notes 31 and 32 supra.
Possibly, if the trust property had not been taxed under the Connecticut succes-
sion tax, the estate tax would have absorbed the maximum credit allowable.
49Note 16 supra.
wrext accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
5 1
Treas. Reg. § 20.20l1-1(a) (1954), T.D. 6526, 1961-1 Cut. BULL. 402 provides
as follows:
(a) IN GENERAL. A credit is allowed under section 2o against
the Federal estate tax for estate, inheritance, legacy or succession
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been correct in disregarding the regulations as an attempt to add to the
statute something which is not there.52
Moreover, it is highly probably that this third limitation will
affect the death tax credit on other property taxed by the state but ex-
pressly excluded from the federal gross estate.5 3 Most states include in
the gross estate, as does section 2o39 of the Internal Revenue Code,5 4
the value of any annuity receivable by the beneficiary by reason of sur-
viving the decedent. However, not all states provide exclusions for
those portions of the annuity that are not attributable to contributions
by decedent or his employer or exclusions for annuities from an employ-
er's qualified trust or pension plan as is provided by the Internal
Revenue Code.5 5 Clearly under the third limitation state taxes on
such annuities excluded from the federal estate would not qualify for
the state death tax credit.5 6
taxes actually paid to any State, Territory, or the District of Co-
lumbia, or, in the case of decedents dying before September 3, 1958,
any possession of the United States (herein after referred to as
"State death taxes'). The credit, 'however, is allowed only for State
death taxes paid (i) with respect to property included in the dece-
dent's gross estate, and (2) with respect to the decedent's estate. The
amount of the credit is subject to the limitation described in para-
graph (b) of this section. It is subject to further limitations describ-
ed in Section 20.2011-2 if a deduction is allowed under Section
2053(d) for State death taxes paid with respect to a charitable gift.
See paragraph (a) of Section 20.2014-1 as to allowance of a credit
for death taxes paid to a possession of the United States in a case
where the decedent died after September 2, 1958.
In other regulations concerning credits against the federal estate tax, the regulations
expressly refer to gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2014-2 (credit for foreign death taxes).
rCJ. United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957). The court stated in
Calamaro that: "... we cannot but regard this Treasury Regulation as no more
than an attempted addition to the statute of something which is not there. As such
the regulation can furnish no sustenance to the statute." Id. at 359. See generally
Brown, Regulations, Reenactment and The Revenue Acts, 54 HARV. L. REV. 377
(1941). According to Mr. Brown there is nothing sacred in Treasury regulations
or other administrative rulings. "They are simply aids-often very helpful and
of great weight, and sometimes even decisive-in interpretation of the statutes; but
they are inherently no more binding than other devices that may be available."
Id. at 378. See also Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L.
REV. 398, 400 (1941). Dean Griswold proposes that the reenactment of a statute fol-
lowing administrative construction should be given no weight whatever in determin-
ing the proper construction of the statute. But see Feller, Addendum to the Regula-
tions Problem, 54 HARV. L. Rv. 1311 (1941).
-rText accompanying notes 54-62 infra.
rAINT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2039. See generally STEPHENS and MAXFELD at 96-1oo.
r;See, e.g., OHio Rlv. CODE ANN. § 573i.og(A) 9: (B) (Baldwin Supp. 1976).
"'In Connecticut, provisions similar to INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 2039(c)(1) & (2)
did not become part of the succession tax law until 1961. This meant that prior
to 1961 such economic benefits from decedent's annuity were taxed by Connecticut
19711
264 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
Further, some states57 tax jointly-owned property as if it were
equally owned by all joint owners and the decedent's interest is taxed
as his fractional share thereof. This is distinctly different from the
federal approach under which section 264o of the Internal Revenue
Code directs the inclusion of jointly owned property in the value of the
gross estate except for such part as was not originally owned by dece-
dent and was not received by the decedent from another joint owner at
less than adequate consideration.58 Consequently, those states might
attribute property to decedent's estate under the fractional share rule
that would be excluded from the federal estate, thus resulting in a
denial of credit under the third limitation.59
If the reasoning of the Court of Appeals is extended to its reason-
at full value because there was a shifting of economic benefit at death with no
exclusions. See Dolak v. Sullivan, 145 Conn. 497, 144 A.2d 312; Borchard v. Con-
nelly, 140 Conn. 491, iOl A.2d 497 (195s). See also Savage, The Proposed Virginia
Estate Tax, 44 VA. L. REV. ioog (1958). Mr. Savage states that:
... [T]here is no express provision in the Virginia statute covering
annuities.... However, the Department of Taxation assesses in-
heritance tax on an annuity, either on the theory that it is a grant
or gift intended to take effect at death, or that it is a retained life
interest. Although it is not the practice of the Department to tax
payments under certain non-contributory and nondesignatory pen-
sions and profit sharing plans, the indefiniteness of the present
law is most unsatisfactory.
Id. at 1021. Cf. N.Y. TAX LAw § 249r-5(b) (McKinney 1966).
O
T
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-343 (1958); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5 7 31.1o(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1969) Refer to discussion of these differences, note 59,
infra.
MCompare INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2040, with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. and
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5 751.io(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1969), § 12-343 (1958). ?. See
generally STEPHENS and MAXFIELD, at 108-117.
"See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 12-343 (1958). Under the Connecticut succession
tax, jointly owned property with the right of survivorship is treated as if owned
equally by all joint owners and the decedent's interest is taxed as his fractional
part. Comment, The Federal Estate Tax and the Connecticut Succession Tax-A
Survey of Their Differences, 36 CONN. BAR. J. 63o (1962) gives the following example
showing how the Connecticut tax differs from the federal tax in this area:
A & B are joint tenants with rights of survivorship. A contributed
the whole cost of $50,000. The land is now worth $0oo,oo0. Under
the Code, if A dies first, the wholes $2oo,ooo is included in his
gross estate. If B dies first, nothing is included in his gross estate.
Under the succession tax, if A dies first, $1oo,ooo is included in his
gross estate. If B dies first, $1ooooo is included in his gross estate.
Id. at 632. It is apparent that under the third limitation, if B dies first, B would
not be entitled to a § 2o11 credit because his interest was not included in the federal
gross estate. See also, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5 731.1o(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1969). (In
Ohio if the joint tenant owners are husband and wife, only 2 the value of the
property is includable in the gross estate). But see CAL. REv. & TAX CODE, § 13671
ffWest 197o); N. Y. TAX LAw, § 249-r(5) (McKinney 1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-152(5)
(1969 Repl. Vol.).
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able and logical conclusion, the third limitation may result in a denial
of the death tax credit on property taxed by the state but not taxed on
the federal return due to a specific deduction or exemption in the fed-
eral estate tax law.60 Such property for which specific exemptions and
deductions are allowable is considered to be a part of the federal gross
estate whereas property excluded by the Code is not considered part of
the gross estate.0 1 The federal marital deduction will serve as a good
example of this extremity.0 2 The majority of states do not allow a de-
duction as does section 2o56 of the Internal Revenue Code for certain
bequests to the surviving spouse. 63 As a result the state would in effect
be taxing property on which there is no tax levy on the federal return.
Ostensibly, if the purpose of the credit is, as decided by the Court of
Appeals, to prevent double taxation, then a credit on such property is
not necessary because only the state is taxing the bequest to the sur-
viving spouse.6
4
A further area in which the requirements of the third limitation
may result in the disallowance of a credit is that of evaluation of dece-
dent's property. Under section 2082 of the Internal Revenue Code,65
the executor may elect to have the value determined a year after death,
O'See Reply Brief for the Appellant at 4, Second Nta'l Bank v. United States, 422
F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1976). According to the government,
[T]he crucial question is whether a property interest is included in
the gross estate and is taken into account in computing the federal
estate tax. It is not a question of the amount of total tax; it is
whether the source of the tax payable is found-through the de-
termination of the federal gross estate-in the property interest in
question.
611d. Compare INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2054, 2056, with INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 2039.
'91NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056. See generally STEPHENS and MAxFxErL at 191-236.
c'See, e.g., Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 5731.og(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1969). In Ohio the
only thing similar to the marital deduction under the federal estate law is a
So,ooo family exemption. See also Korn, The Impact of State Laws on the Marital
Deduction, 47 TAxES 289 (1969). According to Mr. Korn:
Some state death tax laws allow for a marital deduction in the
same vein as the federal law. When this situation arises, savings in
state estate taxes may be as important as those savings that can be
effected for Federal estate tax purposes. Unfortunately, only ten
states, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, and South Carolina,
will allow marital deduction for State death tax purposes.
Id. at 293.
"Another deduction allowed on the federal return but not allowed by many
states is the deduction for losses incurred during the settlement of the estate, aris-
ing from fire, storm, theft or other casualties when not covered by insurance. INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 2054. See generally STEPHENS and MAXFmLD at 176-179. States
that do not allow such a deduction but instead tax the property at its full value
may under the third limitation be denied a credit on this amount.
"INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2032. See generally STEPH"-NS and MAxvIELD at 42-48.
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or at the date of sale or distribution if the property within the gross
estate is sold or distributed within that year. Several states require that
the valuation of the gross estate for succession tax purposes be made as
of the date of death.66 If property becomes worthless during the year
allowed on the federal return no estate tax will be levied with respect
to it. However, in a state requiring the property to be evaluated at
decedent's death the property may be of sufficient value for a state death
tax to be levied on it. Logically, under the third limitation a credit
would be denied with respect to such property.67
Despite all of the aforementioned ramifications, the decision of the
Court of Appeals may well be beneficial in the long run since it should
focus the attention of the states on conforming their death tax laws to
the federal structure in order to obtain the maximum advantage under
the credit. Naturally, with the great diversity in estate tax laws there is
a great increase in expense due to the duplication of collection and ad-
ministrative efforts on the part of federal, state, and local govern-
ments. 68 The individual taxpayer is also burdened by having to deal
with two or more complex death tax concepts.
The court by imposing this third limitation has exceeded the ori-
ginal motives of Congress as far as the credit is concerned, but after
"See, e.g., CAL. R v. & TAx CODE, § 13951 (West 1970); N.Y. TAX LAW, § 249-r
(McKinney 1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-155 (1969 Repl. Vol.). Each of these states
permits valuation as of date of death only.
OThere are many other areas where federal and state laws may differ, resulting
in a loss of credit, such as in the area of transfers in contemplation of death and
deduction for funeral expense. Under the Code gifts made three years prior to death
are conclusively presumed not to be in contemplation of death and are not in-
cluded in decedent's gross estate. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 2035. See generally
STEPHENS and MAXFIELD at 55-64. But in Connecticut, for example, the tax com-
missioner is given the use of only a one year rebuttable presumption that a transfer
was made in contemplation of death. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-341(c) (1958).
However, a Connecticut Superior Court has held that a gift made five years before
the death of the donor was included in decedent's estate as a transfer made in
contemplation of death. Knapes v. Walsh, 16 Conn. Supp. 240 (1949). In Knapes,
decedent (72 years old) just prior to a major operation had his bank account
changed into the names of plaintiff and himself. The plaintiff from that point
forward had the checkbook in her control until decedent died almost five years
later. The transfer was taxed in full as a transfer in contemplation of death. Under
the third limitation a credit might be denied even though the estate paid a state
death tax on the transfer, because under federal estate tax law the gift was con-
clusively presumed not to have been in contemplation of death. See also Savage,
The Proposed Virginia Estate Tax, 44 VA. L. Rlv. 1oo9, 1o23 (1958). Under the
Virginia inheritance tax law no provision is made for deduction for debts, funeral
expenses, cost of administration or taxes. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2053, allows a
deduction from the gross estate for such expenses. Thus, Virginia would levy a
tax with respect to expenses deducted from the federal gross estate.
68See MAXWELL at 34; ADvIsORy COlMMISSION REPORT at 14.
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forty or more years of use it is clear that some action must be taken to-
wards estate tax uniformity. To insure that the maximum credit is
obtained under the third limitation a few states may be induced to
conform their death taxes to the federal estate system but it will take
action by Congress 9 to bring about the necessary uniformity in the
death tax area.70
JAMES M. TuRNER, JR.
nSee Hearings on S. 2483 Before the Subcom. on Intergovernmental Relations
of the Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, gist Congress, 1st Sess., 92 (1969). Mr.
Win. G. Colman, Executive Director, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, made the following recommendations:
[P]roviding for an alternative Federal credit for State estate tax
payments equivalent to 8o percent of the Federal tax liability on
the first $15o thousand of the taxable estate; 20 percent of the tax
liability on the balance of the taxable estate. Based on the latest
available statistics, this two-bracket tax credit paid to the States,
when fully operative, would approximate a uniform 40 percent
credit against the gross tax liability of all taxable estates....
This two-racket [sic] approach would also contribute signifi-
cantly to the stability of State revenues because small and middle-
sized estates are the hard core of their tax base. By the same token,
it would increase the relative shares of the small, less industrial
States without affecting high-wealth States excessively.
The Advisory Commission further recommended that the more
liberal alternative credit for death taxes paid to States be made
available only to those States that:
a. Enact an estate tax in order to ease taxpayer compliance
and tax administrative burdens; and
b. Revise upward their estate tax rates to 'pick-up' the in-
crease in the Federal tax credits for State death tax payments.
S. 2483 would implement this quid pro quo approach making
the enlarged Federal credit contingent on State adoption of the
Federal estate-type levy ....
Id. at 92-93.
1,0 Miller, Federal Courts as Makers of Income Tax Law, 6 TAx L. REv. 151
(1951). Mr. Miller stated the following:
To say that judges ought not to legislate at all in the tax field
would be clearly wrong. Congress often uses words-"income," for
instance-which have several meanings, or otherwise enacts ambigu-
ous tax provisions. Certainly, when the facts in a litigated case
involve a twilight zone of this nature, it is the duty of the court
to take a definite position so far as the facts of that case require,
and the position which the court takes will inevitably have an effect
on future applications of the provision in cases involving similar
facts. To that extent the courts do legislate and must legislate in
the taxation field, and the incidental frustration which tax-
payers suffer from this necessary court legislation must be charged
not to the courts, but to Congress, and to the difficulty of its tax-
imposing task.
Id. at 153.
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